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ABSTRACT After the collapse of a number of banking institutions and bailouts of banks by govern-
ments, regulators have taken a different attitude and now appear keen to take regulation seriously when it
comes to ensuring that banks have adequate capital and sufficient liquidity. Not only that, but in the United
Kingdom, the Independent Commission on Banking Reform has made proposals with regard to the capital
position of banks. This article, which is an overview, will look at matters from a UK perspective and at the
proposals for reform. This article, after its introduction and summary, will look at a number of areas: first, the
reforms made by Basel III; second, the regulation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Sifis) and
the proposals for dealing with these; third, some matters in relation to lending that relate to capital and liquidity
generally; fourth, increased stress testing of banks; fifth, derivatives and risk taking and the new proposed
structure of regulation in the United Kingdom; sixth, the war of spin between regulators and banks; seventh,
Shadow Banking; and eighth, The Independent Commission on Banking Reform and its proposals for reform.
It will also be a theme that the various proposals lack consistency and that this could lead to regulatory
arbitrage. It is already clear that there are inconsistencies between the various regulatory organisations, with
proposals in the United Kingdom indicating that banks will be required to keep much higher levels of capital
than those proposed by Basel and the European Community. The views of those who have pointed out
inconsistencies between the United Kingdom and Basel/Europe have been highlighted.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis is not the first, nor
indeed will it be the last.1 The insolvency of
some of the larger banks in both the United
States and the United Kingdom was because of
the collapse of the housing market and the
entering into leveraged products in relation to
this particular market. Despite the fact that
banks and banking activity has been and is
highly regulated, there were these collapses.
Indeed, the stress testing that will be discussed
subsequently has predicted that, if particular
countries in the European Union such as the
Republic of Ireland, Greece or Portugal default
in relation to their sovereign debt, then there
will also be a banking collapse in that country.2
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Regulators have taken up the issue of the
solvency and liquidity of banks throughout
the world. However, despite this attention and
increased regulation, the problem of banking
collapses remains and it is suggested that it will
continue to remain. Business and banking
involves risk and there will be some banks that
calculate the risk wrongly and in consequence
suffer capital and/or liquidity problems. This is
dealt with in the first section on Basel III and its
development and background.
The issue of ‘too big to fail’ is one that has
grabbed much attention. In the United King-
dom, the Independent Commission on Bank-
ing has not proposed the breaking up of banks
or a Glass–Stegall rigid separation of the retail
and investment parts of a bank. If they fail, such
large banks might be more likely to cause other
banks to fail and are an increased risk for the
financial system. Hence, any regulatory rules
relating to capital cannot just look at the capital
of that bank and not the size of the bank in
question. As larger banks pose greater risks to
the financial system, the argument runs that
they should have increased capital requirements
imposed against them so as to ensure that they
will not fail. The suggested figure of an
increased tier one capital of 10 per cent
measured against risk-weighted assets3 for such
institutions may of course not be sufficient.
These institutions, in the United Kingdom, are
not to be broken up – and therefore, although
the banks in this category are relatively small in
number, they could pose problems for the
financial system in the future. This is dealt with
in the next section, which deals with increased
capital requirements for systemically important
financial institutions.
The subsequent section looks at some
micro-regulatory tools designed to promote
responsible lending. The Bank Levy and
mortgage lending will be looked at briefly.
The role of the FPC is looked at briefly in this
section, though it will be examined much more
fully in the later section, the fifth section, on
leveraged products. Stress testing is now all the
rage, with more frequent tests.4 These are
designed to show whether a particular bank can
withstand possible events of a negative nature
such as economic downturn, increased unem-
ployment, a fall in property prices or sovereign
default. Banks may wish to use watered-down
tests and there were tests used that did not take
into account sovereign default.5 This problem
is now taken much more seriously, and recent
tests have taken sovereign default into account.
However, it has been alleged that some banks
did not supply full or complete information
using ‘loopholes to hold data back’.6 This
indicates that some banks are not compliant
with the rules set by the regulator. Stress testing
is discussed in the fourth section.
The fifth section deals with highly leveraged
products and their effect on the capital and
liquidity of banks. Banks have become involved
directly in derivative and highly leveraged
transactions. These transactions necessarily
involve high degrees of risk. The failure to
impose additional capital requirements might
be a significant weakness in regulation, parti-
cularly if such transactions pose a general
systemic risk. There is support in the United
Kingdom for leveraged controls, both by the
House of Commons and by the Independent
Commission on Banking.7 The regulatory
system in the United Kingdom, under the
Bank of England, will, in the near future,
regulate at a micro and a macro-level and
there have been suggestions that the Bank of
England will want to impose leveraged con-
trols. In these days of spin and control by the
media, there is much discussion about possible
proposals for reform of the regulation of capital
and liquidity of banks in the financial press.
Some banks consider that increased capital
requirements in the United Kingdom would
make them less competitive and be damaging
to economic growth. Not all banks agree with
this and the regulators generally disagree with
such conclusions on the basis that the banks’
clients would wish for safer banks and that the
economic disadvantages of having increased
capital will be relatively small. The issue of spin
is considered in the sixth section.
Clayton
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The fact that some activities can move into
the shadow banking sector that are not regu-
lated is a clear indication that some institutions
have or could move where they cannot be seen
or caught by the regulator. Some banks will of
course carry on transactions in the same way
that non-banks in this sector do. This creates a
number of possible problems: first, those banks
that carry on such activities will be subjected to
greater risk or risks because of the inherent
nature of the type of transactions carried out
in this sector; second, banks will be compet-
ing with non-regulated institutions, which is
undesirable in itself and puts such banks at
greater risk; and third, if there are collapses
of institutions in the shadow banking sector,
this could spread and cause problems for the
traditional banking sector. These are reasons
why regulators are now taking greater interest
in this sector. This is considered in the seventh
section.
Governments are increasingly taking an
active role in setting rules for the regulation
of the capital of banks. This is shown through
the rules now taking effect in Basel III. In the
United Kingdom, the government have set
up the Independent Commission on Banking.
The Independent Commission on Banking has
proposed that retail banks keep higher levels of
capital. These proposed levels of increased
capital are 3 per cent higher than under Basel
III. These proposals and the discussion about
them by members of the commission before
the House of Commons Treasury Committee
are described in the eighth section. In short,
this article seeks to focus on those regulatory
issues that relate to the capital of banks and to
highlight inconsistencies in approach.8 Both
the interim report of the Independent Com-
mission on Banking and its final report will be
analysed.
BASEL III
There is, in general terms, an increased desire
of regulators to look more seriously at the
capital and liquidity of banks and issues relating
to this.
Basel III and its tighter controls
Basel III provides for banks to increase the core
tier one capital base from its current level of
2–7 per cent by 2019.9 The increase in capital is
regarded as a ‘key element’.10 The new rules
have been called a ‘stricter regime’.11 The
idea is to restrict banks’ exposure to credit
risk.12 This capital base will then become the
international standard as a form of soft law13
and will be a ‘benchmark’14 and become
incorporated into hard law, in the case of the
United Kingdom through European Union
directives.15
y clearly the new Basel III standard will
be embraced in a European Directive and
will become binding on the UK as a
minimum. Now, I have no concerns
about that as a minimum standard, indeed
my only concerns about the way the
debate is going is that it is not tough
enough,y16
The Basel Committee originally contained the
regulatory institutions from the following coun-
tries that were its members and that provided
individuals within those organisations, from
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States.17 These have been extended to
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico
and Russia.18 Over 100 countries have imple-
mented Basel19 and ‘Basel III was also a major
step forward in international co-operation’.20
This gives a worldwide membership and tries
to ensure a global base so that (i) countries
will adopt the Basel rules and (ii) banks will
adopt the Basel rules. In particular, there will
be acceptance of Basel.21 Basel III has been
stated to be ‘a fundamental strengthening of
global capital standards’.22 The result will be
that regulators in any country can and will
adopt this standard and formulate regulations
An overview on the inconsistencies of approach in regulating the capital position of banks: Will the UK step out of line with Europe?
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consistent with it. In considering the strength
of, or lack of, an economy, both the IMF and
the World Bank look to see whether that
country has adopted Basel standards.23 Indeed,
in the United Kingdom, the Independent
Commission on Banking Reform is proposing
rules for banks that are beyond Basel III.24 The
IMF has publicly supported the UK view to
have capital standards above those of Basel III.25
Risk-weighted assets
The tier one capital, outlined above, is mea-
sured against risk-weighted assets. There is now
a new focus on risk-weighted assets. These are
now regarded as important for the reason that
their calculation is a matter that does link
to capital adequacy ratios and affects their
accuracy.26 Furthermore, different jurisdic-
tions calculate risk-weighted assets differently
with different jurisdictions having different
approaches. Europe uses the more subjective
approach contained in Basel II to the more
prescriptive approach adopted in the United
States, which adopts the approach in Basel I.26
Lord Turner has stated:
It would be sensible now to look in more
detail at the denominator and examine
whether risk- weighted calculations are
comparable and consistent across banks
and across countries.26
It has been argued that the risk weighting
part of Basel actually discriminates against non-
OECD countries.27 In the United Kingdom,
the Independent Banking Commission is con-
sidering whether to supplement risk weighting
with ‘an aggregate leverage ratio’.28 Much was
said by Sir John Vickers and his team in the
House of Commons about the high level of
leveraging by UK banks and the need for
a leverage ratio. The introduction of such a
leverage ratio, in the United Kingdom, would
set standards beyond those of Basel III. ‘Basel
III, relative to Basel II, has revamped the risk
weights to attempt to address some of the
manifest flaws with the previous risk-weighting
regime. There is also as a back-stop in Basel III
an aggregate leverage ratio, and one of the
points that we have under consideration is
whether a capital constraint in relation to risk-
weighted assets should be supplemented by an
aggregate leverage ratioy’.29 There are a
number of regulators that are keen on this idea
of imposing additional controls on the leverage
of banks.30
Capital buffers: Capital buffer and
countercyclical buffer
There are two capital buffers as part of Basel III.
There is a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per
cent. Banks that fail to meet this buffer of
2.5 per cent will have restrictions on dividend
and bonus payments.31 This, in addition to the
countercyclical buffer, is discussed below.32
This capital countercyclical buffer can be raised
by up to 2.5 per cent32 in poor economic times
and lowered in good economic times. The
point is that it links the regulation of banks and
economic policy.33 It has been argued that
additional buffers that are only imposed in
some countries could produce distortion.34
However, the government regard it as leading
to a level playing field:35
Basel III promotes a level playing field
between domestic and foreign banks
through the principle of reciprocity,
under which the size of the counter-
cyclical buffer is linked to geographical
location of all exposures. Under Basel,
reciprocity is obligatory for a buffer of up
to 2.5 per cent. However, national author-
ities have the option of requiring their
banks with exposures in a foreign juris-
diction to apply a buffer of beyond
2.5 per cent.36
Having a countercyclical buffer is regarded
as ‘very significant’.37 There are reasons for
having the countercyclical buffer: (i) to ensure
that banks have additional capital to cope with
the low end of the cycle and (ii) to actually help
even out the high end of the cycle that might
Clayton
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otherwise lead to substantial house price
increases.38 The financial crisis, the collapse of
banks and bailouts of government have in-
dicated the need for banks to create such
buffers so as to deal with bad economic times.39
It is also regarded as important to have
this countercyclical buffer at times of credit
growth.40 However, if this buffer is not released
when economic times improve, then ‘it isn’t
really countercyclical but simply an incremental
layer of capital’.41 If a number of countries use
the buffer when things are worsening, then
it could lead to better coordination.42 Such
cooperation is important with regard to cyclical
instruments such as the countercyclical buf-
fer.43 Any possible lack of cooperation and
coordination with regard to such a buffer needs
to be addressed.43 The use of the Basel III
countercyclical buffer:
y represents an important step towards
achieving a better coordination between
home and host authorities in the deploy-
ment of macroprudential tools, and
might serve as a model for international
coordination of macroprudential policies
more generally.42
Liquidity
There is increased desire by regulators to look
at liquidity issues. This means that banks must
keep greater liquidity and can demonstrate that
they are able to withstand a lack of liquidity that
may last up to 30 days.44 Both Basel and the
FSA have issued a number of policy papers on
the importance and need to maintain liquid-
ity.45 The Committee on Banking Supervision
responsible for Basel III have proposed a
Liquidity Coverage Ratio so that banks are
able to possess sufficient quality assets to
withstand a situation of lack of funding over a
period of time.46 This is a matter that can be
tested by regulators.47 Currently, both Basel
and Mervyn King favour the use of a liquidity
buffer of up to 30 days to protect against
possible market disruption or crisis.48 The FSA
has stress tested this 30-day situation for UK
banks but also a less severe 90-day situation.49 It
has been reported that banks were not content
in 2010 when they had to increase their
liquidity and argued to the FSA that this should
not be done until 2015 when there would be a
uniform set of liquidity rules for all banks set by
Basel in 2015.51 Although the UK regulators
appear to adopt a strict approach when it comes
to liquidity, this approach is criticised by the
chairperson of the Treasury Select Committee,
and on its website it states: ‘Liquidity squeeze
could hit credit and hold back recovery – Tyrie
warns Bank of England and FSA’.50 In a letter
dated 20 October 2011 to both Mervyn King
and Hector Sants, he concludes in relation to
this area: ‘The squeeze on bank liquidity is
running the risk of continued credit contrac-
tion, setting back the prospects of economic
recoveryy A number of ideas have been put
forward as a means of relieving the liquidity
squeeze. Whether any of these should be
deployed is something the FPC may want
to consider’.51 Of course views differ, but
this again shows an inconsistent approach at a
high level. Recently, Paul Tucker has indicated
that tough regulatory controls on liquidity
could undermine the Quantitative Easing
Programme.52
The criticism of Basel III rules
However, there are critics of Basel III. One
commentator sees it as too rigid.53 Criticisms
have been made that Basel III is a ‘one size fits
all’ solution.54 Some critics regard Basel III as
being weak and watered-down as a result of
bank lobbying.55 Mervyn King is of the view
that the new Basel III rules ‘will not prevent
another crisis for a number of reasons’.56 First,
higher amounts of capital would be required,
and such capital levels would be considered to
be far too high in the opinion of the bank-
ing industry. Second, the risk weights are not
necessarily accurate as they are based on
previous experience that could become poor
estimates for the future. Third, Basel III focuses
too much on the assets side of a balance sheet
An overview on the inconsistencies of approach in regulating the capital position of banks: Will the UK step out of line with Europe?
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rather than on liabilities, and hence may not
effectively deal with the risks that follow from a
lack of liquid assets.57 Another commentator
regards Basel III as creating a period of
uncertainty as it is unclear as to the effect the
rules will have.58 Necessarily, Basel III is
untested in a crisis situation.59 In the opinion
of Mervyn King,60 the Basel ratios in relation
to capital proved themselves to be ‘a poor
predictor of bank failures’,60 and that in the
light of that, the Bank of England will place
great weight upon leverage ratios.60
Some previous problems with Basel
There were also significant problems previously
with Basel in that banks used securitised
property as part of its tier one capital. Such
assets were inadequate when property prices
collapsed in the sub-prime mortgage market.
Banks that wish to improve their financial
position are selling their assets and this is taking
place at the present time in order for the banks
to be able to meet the requirements of the Basel
III rules. Such assets include securities that
contain mortgages and sub-prime loan assets
that caused the problems with the collapse of
the banking system.61 This has also been done
by raising of additional capital.62 One bank has
set up a fund to help other banks increase their
capital.63 Banks are now also entering into
CoCo bonds that become equity instead of
debt if and when the bank’s capital is too low
and if these are misused or overused as with
securitised property, then this could cause
widespread financial instability.64 These CoCo
bonds could be manipulated by the market and
uncertainties about when they are triggered
could lead to unpredictable results in times of
systemic economic failure.65 It would appear
that both the FSA and the Independent
Commission on Banking66 approve of the idea
of banks issuing bonds that would convert to
equity in the event of that bank hitting financial
problems.67 Sir John Vickers has indicated that
it is better for these to be issued in good
economic times rather than in bad economic
times, when it would be difficult to raise such
funding.69 However, the increasing complexity
of the Basel framework will encourage the
development of avoidance on the part of the
banks.68 The national regulator will then have
to close the loopholes, which may take some
time to do.72 Ultimately, the UK regulatory
system will have to be ‘open minded’69 about
these contingent capital bonds. These bonds,
which convert from debt to equity, should be
capable of being triggered at an early stage.73
A better solution, in the view of Paul Tucker,
would be to have higher levels of equity in
banks generally.73
First best would be equity. Indeed, Adair
has argued this evening that ideally Basel
3 would have set a higher equity require-
ment. But that did not happen.70
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
What constitutes a ‘systemically important
financial institutions’ (‘Sifis’) is a difficult
question as the general economic context must
be considered.71 The FSA has suggested the
following possible additional controls that
could be imposed against Sifis: first, there
should be additional capital requirements im-
posed; second, restrictions on their activities
and limits on their riskier activities; and third,
controls on the size of such institutions.72 Lord
Turner considers the idea of regulating Sifis to
be a ‘wise’ one.73 Lord Turner has indicated
publicly that any losses that Sifis incur shall be
spread and recovered from all institutions that
lend. This would seek to ensure that the
taxpayer is not subject to any exposure.74 The
importance of the quality of the capital that is
possessed by Sifis has also been identified as a
matter of importance.75
The IMF has suggested that there should be
an increase in the fees paid by Sifis. The idea of
these fees is that they would be put into a fund,
which might be used to assist distressed banks.
The exact amount of additional capital that
Clayton
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such institutions might hold is between 1 and 9
per cent and might extend to up to 30 Sifis.76
The subsequent development of Basel III to
require systemically important banks to hold
additional capital is clearly sensible. It is also a
matter that is difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain because it depends on the particular
facts that cannot be known in advance.
Different institutions from those regarded as
the important ones might be the ones that
should have been regarded as systemically
important.77 It has been suggested by the
Chairperson of HSBC, Douglas Flint, that the
number of Sifis should be extended to beyond
80 such institutions, which would be an
increase on the figure of 30 proposed by the
IMF.78 Furthermore, in his view, such institu-
tions would be required to hold additional
amounts of capital.82 Such increase in capital
could be left as a matter to be dealt with by the
various national authorities.79 It is understood
that the European Union is considering
proposing changes to the Capital Requirements
Directive ‘CRD’ so that such institutions are
brought within the CRD.80 The Basel Com-
mittee have indicated that they wish to
consider the introduction of additional loss
absorbency for Sifis.81 In the view of Douglas
Flint, the number of such Sifis should be on the
high side rather than the lower side, as the
holding of increased capital has an anti-
competitive effect and thus institutions should
be placed within the list rather than outside it.
To do otherwise would give those placed
outside it a competitive advantage. However,
as smaller banks have disproportionately higher
costs in raising capital, the imposition of
additional capital for Sifis evens out the position
for smaller banks.82 Sir John Vickers is aware of
the issue of competitive disadvantage to Sifis in
the United Kingdom; however, in his view, if a
10 per cent capital base was an international
standard, then there would be no problem.83
Our hope would be that for systemically
important institutions, something of that
level [at least 10 per cent] would be the
international standard, in which case
the question falls away. If you had a huge
difference between the UK standard and
the international standard, then the arbit-
rage possibilities that you allude to could
start to come into play.83
These additional capital requirements proposed
by Basel III are noted by the Independent
Commission for Banking.84 However, consis-
tent with their approach for other matters
relating to capital,85 such additional amounts
are seen by the Independent Commission on
Banking ‘as a minimum level above which
national jurisdictions may wish, and are free
to go’.89
Currently, there is a clear difference between
the proposals in England and those of Basel
and Europe. The difficulties that Sir John
Vickers indicates would then materialise.
Sir John Vickers had previously stated in a
keynote speech:86 ‘one takes the view that the
loss-absorbing capacity of banks needs to be
massively enhanced – and beyond the prospec-
tive requirements of Basel III in the case of
systemically-important institutions – there are
dilemmas about how best to achieve that’.91
The approach that Sifis should have higher
capital standards has also been followed by the
Financial Stability Board ‘FSB’. The FSB has
published a report87 in which it states that
global Sifis should have higher loss absorbency
‘beyond the minimum agreed Basel III stan-
dards’.88 Large banks included within the top
tier are required to have capital of 2.5 per cent
beyond the capital that they are already
required to keep.89 It is understood that the
banks within this 2.5 per cent tier include
Barclays, HSBC, Citigroup, JP Morgan,
Deutsche Bank, Bank of America and the
Royal Bank of Scotland.94 A second group
of banks will be required to have capital of
2.0 per cent beyond the capital that they are
already required to keep. It is understood that
the banks within this 2.0 per cent tier include
Credit Suisse, UBS, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley.94 A third group of banks will
An overview on the inconsistencies of approach in regulating the capital position of banks: Will the UK step out of line with Europe?
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be required to have additional capital of
0.5-2.0 per cent. It is estimated that there will
be between 10 and 15 banks included within
this third grouping.94 A further estimate puts
the number of banks as high as 20 banks.90
Overall, around 30 banks will be required to
have this additional capital.94 This proposal has
been criticised on three grounds: first, that it
does not solve the too big to fail problem;
second, because these larger banks will neces-
sarily be bailed out, this creates a situation
where customers will retain deposits with such
banks and ignore any risks knowing that the
particular government will ultimately protect
their deposits; and third, these additional
amounts of capital that must be kept by the
larger banks further increases the amounts of
capital that must be kept and will lead to
additional costs for borrowers.91 These new
proposals for Sifis have been criticised as
‘overkill’.92 This proposed change has already
led banks in the United States to campaign for
these new rules not to be implemented.93 In
contrast, some regulators in the United States
have indicated that rules requiring additional
amounts of capital for the larger banks in the
United States should be introduced.94 Most
recently, the Final Report of the Independent
Commission on Banking94 was of the view that
there was a ‘strong public interest’95 that
systemically important banks should hold more
loss-absorbing debt and equity ‘than they
would choose themselves’.95 In particular, the
Independent Commission on Banking recom-
mended that the large UK ring-fenced banks
and the largest UK systemically important
banks be required to hold primary loss-
absorbing capacity of at least 17 per cent of
risk-weighted assets.96 This recommendation
of the Independent Banking Commission is
that this can be increased to up to 20 per cent
of risk-weighted assets, should the regulator
have concerns about the bank.97 Where an
individual bank, or the group of banks as a
whole, falls below this figure, then the regu-
lator could impose restrictions upon distribu-
tions or bonuses.98 Again, the Independent
Banking Commission is raising the standards
ahead of Basel and those proposed to be used
internationally.99 At a European Union level,
there will be changes in its Capital Directive so
as to incorporate Basel III.100 Such amend-
ments will include new provisions relating to
Sifis where such banks pose risks ‘to the
financial system taking into account the
identification of systemic risk’.101 Further, such
institutions are to be stress tested so that
systemic risk can be identified and measured.102
It has been suggested103 that, in addition to
stress-testing individual banks, there should be
a collective stress test for all Sifis as a complete
group. Regardless of what regulators might
attempt to do, and this includes enabling
greater transparency and providing for resolu-
tion regimes, one view is that it is up to the
market to discipline the banks and this includes
the Sifis.
The Basel accords provide an interna-
tionally standardised set of rudimentary
best practices in bank regulation, but they
can only perform well in synergy with the
market.104
However, if there are differences in approach to
Sifis, then those countries with low additional
surcharges for Sifis will be ‘at an advantage’.105
RESPONSIBLE LENDING
Lending responsibly
One of the problems with the collapse of the
banking system is that the banks lent too much
money to individuals who were not able to
repay. The consequence of this is that the
regulatory system needs to take steps to ensure
that it does not lend too much and cause
problems for itself. The problem is worse in the
commercial property area where commercial
property prices have fallen by an estimated
20 per cent.106 The FSA proposed mortgage
affordability tests from October 2009 to
attempt to ensure that lenders would lend to
Clayton
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individual borrowers in a way that was within
their means to repay and one that was res-
ponsible.107 The FSA wants lenders to properly
assess the income of borrowers and to reduce
the amount lent to those with a poor credit
history.108 There have been accusations by the
FSA that banks have moved customers to more
lenient terms to minimise bad debts.109 A firm
was fined a substantial amount by the FSA for
lending irresponsibly and this demonstrates that
actions are being taken by the regulatory
authorities.110 There are proposals for further
reforms including income verification and
limits upon interest – only loans.111 The FSA
has introduced stricter mortgage rules.112
There are also new principles in lending that
include: stress testing; the possibility of interest
rate rises; and that the lender is to ignore the
possibility of increased property prices.112
Bank levy
A number of European governments have
proposed a levy upon their banks to meet the
cost of any future crisis involving banks.113
Further, the contribution paid by the bank
should reflect the systemic risk posed by that
bank.114 The levy that has been introduced
into the United Kingdom, from January 2011
on banks with £20 billion of liabilities, is
modelled on the IMF Report120 and aims to
encourage banks not to use risky funding
models that could threaten the financial
stability of the United Kingdom.115 It is
thought that it will raise two and a half billion
pounds from the banks.116
The Financial Policy Committee and
mortgage lending
Having stricter rules so that banks do not over-
lend is one way of tackling the problem of
overheating of the financial system. In relation
to domestic lending, a rule requiring a 20 per
cent deposit has been proposed in the United
States.117 In the United Kingdom, the reforms
to regulation include the setting up of the
Financial Policy Committee ‘FPC’ within the
Bank of England, which will have powers to
stop any over-lending on the part of individual
banks or the banking system generally. This
would include financial limits on individual
mortgages and powers in relation to the capital
bases of banks.118 The Independent Commis-
sion on Banking Reform is aware of the use of
such tools and agrees that it would be correct
for the proposed FPC to have controls in
relation to mortgage lending. ‘An example of
such a tool could be a loan-to-value cap on
mortgage lending – already in use in Hong
Kong and Singapore, among others – which
may be used to lean against a house price boom
by shifting the balance of capital provision away
from banks and towards individuals’.119
STRESS TESTING AND ITS
FAILURES AND
CONSEQUENCES
These necessarily complement other types of
regulation regarding the capital of banks and
are regarded as an additional ‘valuable’120 tool.
Stress testing in Europe
The stress testing that has taken place in Ireland
has proved unreliable as stress tests that gave
the banks there a clean bill of health then
collapsed only a short time later.121 In the
opinion of Lord Turner, these tests were still
‘useful exercises’122 but it was important to
distinguish liquidity from solvency problems.
Further, in the view of Lord Turner, such tests
were not ‘sufficiently extreme’.123 In the view
of one commentator, the failure of some
stress testing to take on board sovereign debt
effectively rendered them invalid and was
irresponsible on the part of the regulators.124
In the view of that commentator, such tests
should test at the extreme, and it was wrong
not to include the risk of sovereign debt when
stress testing Greek banks.125 Subsequently, the
regulators in Greece were concerned about the
exposure of Greek banks to sovereign debt, and
the stress testing carried out by the European
Banking Authority (EBA) in June 2011 did
include exposure to Greek Sovereign Debt.126
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The United Kingdom
Hector Sants, Chief Executive of the FSA,
has indicated that the Prudential Regulatory
Authority will take stress testing seriously with
teams that will have particular knowledge of
the bank that is being stress tested.127 The FSA,
which will be the predecessor of the Prudential
Regulatory Authority, has run stricter tests
than those undertaken by the EBA.128 This
indicates an inconsistency in approach, which
could cause uncertainties for the banks who
will be unclear as to what amounts of capital
they should hold. In the UK stress tests carried
out by the FSA, the regulator required banks to
have a tier one ratio of 8 per cent.129 Lord
Turner is quoted as saying that the tests carried
out by the EBA are a ‘useful exercise’ even
though the UK tests are ‘tougher and tigh-
ter’.134 In the view of Lord Turner, ‘a stress test
is designed to imagine things that don’t occur’,
and should be tough.130 This has not always
been the approach of the EBA.131 It appears to
be the position that the FSA requires banks to
have a liquidity buffer sufficient for 3 months of
stress, which was greater than the 1 month
provided for under Basel.132 The FSA,
which will become the Prudential Regulation
Authority, are currently about to introduce
business model assessments, which will look at
the revenues of the banks it assesses and also any
funding from the Bank of England’s special
liquidity scheme. As part of the assessment,
there will be stress tests.133 It has also been
suggested that the results of stress testing should
be translated into the planning about banks’
liquidity and capital.134
EBA
Paradoxically, the EBA instead of increasing the
strictness of its testing has actually reduced it.
Previously, a 20 per cent fall in share price was
built into the model, whereas in the later test in
2011 only built in a 15 per cent fall in share
price.135 There were criticisms that these
results, in July 2011, were ‘skewed’136 and
calculated in different ways in different coun-
tries.142 The stress testing in July 2011 by the
EBA did take on sovereign lending and
how likely default will be in relation to such
lending.137 These tests in July 2011 resulted in
failure by eight banks138 with a shortfall of
capital of over two billion pounds.139 In
contrast to the tests in 2010, the large Spanish
and Italian banks fared well in these tests in
2011.145 The EBA were concerned that some
countries adopted their own standards rather
than those proposed by the EBA.140 However,
sovereign debt default was included and those
banks that had not taken it into account were
asked to retest.141 Those banks that failed the
stress testing would have to enter into distressed
debt deals.140 Andrea Enria, chairperson of the
EBA, is reported as saying that taking on board
sovereign risk when stress testing is a matter
that is ‘highly relevant’.142 Further, Andrea
Enria, talking about the tests in 2010, was of
the view that those banks that passed the stress
testing narrowly should be subject to regulatory
intervention, such as the capping of their
dividends.143 It has also been suggested that
stress testing should be used to provide
information to the market about the financial
position of particular banks, such information
not currently being available to the market.144
It has been accepted and noted by the EBA that
some countries have set higher standards than
in the European Union.
The EBA notes that national authorities
in countries currently in IMF-EU pro-
grammes are strengthening the capital of
banks in their countries and in many cases
have, or will be, setting capital standards
to a higher level than that in the EU wide
tress test in order to address uncertainties.145
The United States
In the United States where 19 banks were stress
tested in 2009, 10 failed to successfully pass the
test and two American banks were asked
to raise around 75 billion dollars within a
few months.146 In order to be allowed by the
regulatory authorities to repurchase shares or
declare dividends, the various American banks
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being stress tested would have to pass the
test.147 As a consequence of stress testing in the
United States, the regulatory authorities asked
the top 10 banks in America to raise 74.6
billion dollars.148 Stress testing has been used in
the United States to determine whether
particular banks were able to repay the USA
government funds that were lent to them
during the crisis.149 Stress testing in the United
States has been used for different reasons than
that in Europe. In Europe, the regulators have
had genuine concerns about the banks in
which they regulate and the stress testing was
seeking to minimise the possible problems of
liquidity and capital adequacy that banks might
have. In contrast, in the United States, the
stress testing appeared to be directed for the
regulators’ benefit.150 It is interesting that
the tier one capital figure that was used in the
stress testing in November 2011 was 5 per cent,
which is lower than those proposed by Basel,
Europe and the United Kingdom.151 Where
US banks have been able to demonstrate that
they have capital reserves of above 5 per cent
of their risk-weighted assets, they are to be
allowed by the Federal Reserve to use their
annual earnings to pay substantial dividends to
their shareholders.152 This approach has been
criticised 153 on the basis that such repayments
of dividends should only be allowed when
banks have put in place the increased capital
requirements of Basel III. This represents not
just a difference of timing but a substantial
difference of approach.
Summary
What might be concluded is that stress testing is
now part of what regulators do worldwide.
This marks a significant change from the posi-
tion before the banking collapse. In the United
Kingdom, the approach is that the regulator
must form its own view of the financial posi-
tion of the bank it supervises. If the regulator
feels that it has genuine concerns about the
soundness or safety of the bank it supervises,
then action must be taken by the regulator.154
Nevertheless, inconsistencies in approach have
been seen with different regulators in different
countries taking different approaches to such
stress testing. Further different regulators regard
such testing with varying degrees of impor-
tance. One commentator, Kamal Mustafa, has
made the point that the fact that there was a
need for this stress testing has indicated that the
levels of capital held by banks was far too
low.155 Furthermore, one of his conclusions is
that there is inconsistency of approach by
regulators in relation to stress testing:
Global and regulatory authorities have yet
to define a standard approach and method-
ology towards stress testing. Banks are
being pressured to perform stress tests
without any direction and specific criteria.
Different regulatory bodies are requesting
different stress tests with varying levels
of detail and substantially different
focuses.156
To deal with this criticism, the EBA is required
to provide national authorities with ‘common
methodologies’157 in relation to stress testing
and ‘common approaches to communication
on the outcome of these assessments’.164 As
regulatory authorities develop and use stress
testing, it could lead to a standardised approach
and ‘common language’.158
DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS
AND RISK
Prudential supervision in the United
Kingdom
At a general regulatory level, there is the dis-
closure that the Treasury and the Bank of
England allegedly gave [‘water[ed] down’]
figures to the IMF about the state of UK
public finances before the collapse.159 This
disclosure is contained in a report made by the
IMF’s independent watchdog.166 This watch-
dog has also criticised the IMF itself for failing
to identify and appreciate the banking collapse
that occurred and to take measures in relation
An overview on the inconsistencies of approach in regulating the capital position of banks: Will the UK step out of line with Europe?
11& 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1745-6452 Journal of Banking Regulation 1–27
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
to it. There have been criticisms of the system
of regulation in the United Kingdom during
the banking crisis.160 The reforms that are
taking place with regard to the regulation of
banks are not a central part of this article;
however, it has been indicated by Mervyn King
that the Prudential Regulatory Authority will
look at the big picture and the financially
important areas, which will include capital and
liquidity issues.161 The concept of a more wide
ranging regulatory supervision covering the
general supervision over capital and liquidity of
banks is supported on the basis that it will link
regulation and general monetary and economic
policy.162 Despite the proposed reforms that
would have one institution involved in micro
and macro prudential regulation, there could
still be problems in that systemic risk might still
not be fully considered. It remains to be seen
whether this structure would stop a financial
crisis of a different nature happening in the
future. Much might depend upon how well
each part communicates with each other;
however, micro-prudential regulators might
still have a narrow focused approach and still
not draw relevant matters to the attention of
those involved in macro-prudential regulation.
In the view of one academic: ‘y looking at
systemic risk is a sound idea, but because
although supervisors were looking at individual
trees-not necessarily always very well-they
didn’t have a view of the foresty’.163 How-
ever, the Governor of the Bank of England
takes the view that the combined regulatory
system in the United Kingdom is likely to be
much more effective: ‘Prudential supervision is
rather different. This is about saying that most
banks are all taking the same kind of risk, that
leverage ratios have reached a point when
we ought to be deeply concerned about the
fragility of the system, and that is something
that I hope the new arrangement of a
combination of the PRA focusing on the big
questions for individual banks and the new
FPC focusing on system-wide developments
will be able to give us a better chance of deal-
ing with these problems than happened last
time’.164 Both micro and macro views are
necessary in order ‘to reach forward-looking
judgments’.165
However, it has been made clear by Mervyn
King that the FPC will be independent of the
Chancellor and will make its own independent
decisions. The FPC will also be able to make its
decisions in relation to capital adequacy and
capital buffers, which will be binding upon the
PRA.166 ‘When it comes to the decisions on
the regulation of individual institutions or the
decisions about the instruments that you will
give to the FPC about, for example, counter-
cyclical capital requirements, those are the
responsibility of the FPC and shouldn’t be
second guessed by the Chancellor. They have
to be decided by those bodies’.167 The new
regulator, the Bank of England, will therefore
have combined functions. This combined with
increased powers could lead to a new super-
regulator.168 Differences in approach could
be ironed out, if there is a will to do this.
However, as will be seen, the approach of
regulation in the United Kingdom will require
banks to have higher levels of capital than their
European counterparts and not to iron out
potential differences of approach. There could
be inconsistencies at the start and these will
continue in the future if and when the United
Kingdom introduces higher capital ratios over
UK banks.169
The details of the new Basel accord in this
area aren’t pinned down yet. As they
become pinned down then the FSA will
need to think about how it wants to
converge its regime into the Basel regime,
but it’s quite hard for them to do that
when the Basel regime hasn’t got all the i’s
dotted and t’s crossed.170
Indeed, there is acceptance that different
countries are likely to have different rules
initially as convergence is now only an ‘aim’171
and there will be ‘different starting points’178 in
relation to capital buffers. If the UK regulators
do not converge with Basel rules, then they run
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the risk that they also do not converge with
European rules, as the European Commission is
to introduce the Basel rules into its new capital
regulations. Indeed, it has been pointed out
that the UK’s approach will be entirely
different, with higher standards, than the rest
of Europe. This difference will be increased
further when the ring-fencing proposals take
place.172 This divergence of approach and
structure has been summarised by one lawyer:
This is a cack-handed request by the UK
to Europe to say: we understand you are
trying to put together a single European
framework, but would you mind if we set
up an entirely separate one for our
national banks?173
Central counterparty clearing
It has been confirmed that there are no plans
for those banks entering into derivative
transactions but not involved in central coun-
terparty clearing ‘CCP’ to be subject to an
additional capital levy or charge: ‘Another
international standard setter the Basel Com-
mittee is looking at what the appropriate capital
charges should be for financial institutions
which are not using a CCP. They may also
conclude that there should be a capital charge
for using a CCP as well, so there may be that
international standard. It is possible that, as a
result of consultation and the due process of
impact assessment, the FSA would decide that
there should be some additional capital charge,
but I am not aware that there are any plans to
do that at this stage’.174 However, There has
been the express approval of the suggestion of
having leveraged controls in addition to con-
trols over capital.175 ‘Given that capital and
liquidity reform will not be sufficient, and that
leverage appears to be an indicator of poten-
tially increasing risk, we support the introduc-
tion of a leverage ratio. Such a ratio does not
adjust for risk, and thus is not satisfactory on its
own, but is a useful addition to (inevitably
imperfect) risk-weighted measures’.176 Stefan
Ingves, current chair of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, regards a 33 per cent
leverage ratio as the ‘ultimate break’177 if ‘we
don’t do the models right’.184 The Indepen-
dent Commission on Banking strongly dis-
agreed with this suggested 33 per cent leverage
ratio on the basis that it was far too lenient.
Such a view makes considerable sense for the
reasons given by the Independent Commission,
but it again shows differences in approaches at
high level.
y a leverage cap of thirty-three is too lax
for systemically important banks, since it
means that a loss of only 3 per cent of
such banks’ assets would wipe out their
capitaly.178
The FPC is to increase transparency by
requiring banks to publish their leverage ratio
by 2013, whereas this will not be required by
Basel III until 2015.179 Further, the Capital
Requirements Directive is to be updated to
include the ‘risk of excessive leverage’180 and its
leverage ratio will come into force from
1 January 2015.181 It may well be correct to
introduce such controls. However, the point is
that again there is inconsistency in approach
with the United Kingdom appearing to want
regulations that are earlier and possibly higher
than in other countries. Further, Mervyn King
has sought and obtained additional powers for
the PRA so that it will have the right to
demand that a particular bank modifies its
financial position so as to reduce its leverage
ratio.182 The FPC, in exercising its functions to
assist the Bank of England in achieving its
Financial Policy Objective183 will be respon-
sible for ‘the identification of, monitoring
of, and taking action to remove or reduce,
systemic risks with a view to protecting and
enhancing the resilience of the UK financial
system’.184 These systemic risks include, in
particular ‘unsustainable levels of leverage, debt
or credit growth’.184 The FPC ‘must have
regard to ythe international obligations of
the United Kingdom’184 and particularly so
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where the FPC actions relate to powers to be
exercised by the PRA or FCA.184 Further, the
FPC will be able to direct the FCA or the PRA
to exercise its functions ‘so as to ensure the
implementation, by or in relation to a specified
class of regulated persons, of a macro-pruden-
tial measurey’.184 The Treasury by order
will prescribe what is a ‘macro-prudential
measure’.184
In the context of setting higher capital
standards, the argument of the FPC would be
that the CRD Directive is merely a minimum
standard, and setting higher standards will
comply with the CRD Directive and the
international obligations of the United King-
dom. Further, by putting macro-prudential
instruments into secondary legislation, the
government considers that greater flexibility
will be achieved.
Establishing the toolkit in secondary
legislation will allow the Government to
better reflect any international develop-
ments in macro-prudential policyy185
Such an approach, which would mean that
great discretion is vested in the FPC, has been
criticised by Simon Gleeson on the basis that
the European approach is rule based, whereas
the United Kingdom, in contrast, is about to
introduce a discretionary-based system
It really does not matter whether it would
be a good idea for the UK to have a fully
discretionary regulatory system – the EU
is in the process of building a fully rules-
based system with policy making reserved
to the European Banking Authorityy.182
THE WAR OF SPIN
It is clear that the banks lobbied the Basel
Committee for changes to Basel III and that
the banks were able to discuss their specific
concerns with the Basel Committee.186 As a
consequence, some of the Basel III rules were
softened as banks indicated that otherwise their
lending would be restricted,187 in particular,
the softening of the rules in Basel III through
less rigid definitions of liquidity and a phasing
in of the rules over a longer period of time.188
In addition, the definition of capital was relaxed
so as to include government and corporate
bonds, which would count as part of the bank’s
relevant capital.189 One of the concerns of the
banks regarding Basel III is that requirements
for banks to keep increased capital will make
them less efficient. In particular, the Banks have
stated that Basel III will result in increased costs
for them resulting in increased charges for
those using payment systems.190 The sugges-
tions made by banks that they would move to
other jurisdictions as a consequence of capital
adequacy reforms is a matter regarded as of
‘questionable credibility’,191 ‘very depres-
sing’192 and a ‘fantasy’.193 Others regard this
as a real possibility that if banks were required
to hold additional capital in the United
Kingdom, then they would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage compared with their
European counterparts, and would move to
European destinations.194
Douglas Flint, chairperson of HSBC, regards
increased capital requirements as putting UK
banks in a position that makes them less
competitive and damaging to the whole of
the City of London.195 It has been suggested
that Basel III will mean that banks will not lend
for long periods and their customers will have
to borrow on the bond market instead.196
Douglas Flint, chairperson of the FSA, has
given his view that Basel III rules will
significantly affect the willingness of banks to
lend.197 The OECD have indicated that the
capital requirements of 7 per cent tier one
capital would increase the cost of lending by
50 base points and would lower growth by
0.05 to 0.15 percentage points.198 The French
Banking Federation is of the view that Basel III
could reduce the GDP in the euro-zone by
more than 6 per cent.199 One estimate suggests
that German Banks will need over £50 billion
in order to recapitalise.200 In relation to the
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report of the Vickers Commission, the banks
lobbied extensively so as to seek to tone down
the report.201 Banks have also suggested that
increasing the capital requirements will increase
the cost of lending.202 In addition, it could lead
to fewer loans being made.203 Moreover, as
banks have extra costs as a result of Basel III, it
will lead to increased interest rates so that banks
recoup some of these costs.204 Not only could
it lead to increased costs of lending, it could
also lead to less lending, as the need and
requirement of increased capital buffers have
‘unsettled bank lending’.205 The Basel Com-
mittee have played down such concerns and
any reduction in lending would be small and
much less than suggested by the banks.206 It has
also been suggested that, if a particular country
imposes additional capital requirements beyond
those of other comparable countries, that this,
instead of being anticompetitive, will improve
the standing of such banks as their clients will
regard them as safer entities.207
There have also been dialogues at govern-
ment level between senior regulatory officials
where one country feels that another country is
not compliant or fully compliant with Basel
III.208 One of the possible reasons for having
capital controls is to ensure a level playing field
so that banks in one country do not have an
unfair advantage over banks in other coun-
tries.209 The banks in the 1980s believed that
there was not a level-playing field. In particular,
bankers in London and New York were of the
view that lack of international controls over the
capital of banks gave Japanese banks advantages,
as they were subject to less rigorous financial
controls.210 However, this view is challenged
by one member of the Basel secretariat who
indicates that, although observers often took
this view, this was not in fact the position. In
his view, the objective of Basel was to simply
strengthen the capital position of banks so as to
provide safe and sound banking systems and
to protect depositors.211 The extent to which
Basel has and will lead to a level playing field is
a matter that ‘is still uncertain’.212 If the UK
banks are required to hold more capital than
their European counterparts, then there will be
an unlevel field. If UK banks are to have higher
capital ratios and hold more lower yielding
assets than their rivals, their profitability will be
further reduced.213
A crucial question is whether the decline
in GDP will be higher in some countries
than others and whether some countries’
banks will be more affected than others.
This depends in part on whether the
Basel rules will be implemented uni-
formly in each country. It is far from clear
that they will be. Last month it was
revealed that the E.U. may delay a
decision on whether to adopt Basel III’s
leverage and liquidity rules, although
Michael Barniery has since denied that
the E.U. will do so. The truth remains to
be seen.214
SHADOW BANKING
Critics have indicated that the ‘shadow bank-
ing’ sector could pose problems in that its
institutions are not regulated in the same way as
banks are and do not have to keep the same
capital as banks.215 Further, the Basel rules
apply to banks and not other institutions.216
This gives the shadow banking sector advan-
tages over the banking sector and results in an
unlevel playing field.217 It also encourages
institutions to put their assets into the un-
regulated shadow banking sector.218 Therefore,
riskier transactions move into the shadow
banking sector,219 and furthermore, collapse
of institutions within the shadow banking
sector could lead to a risk of damage to the
whole financial sector.220 One commentator
correctly identifies this as a ‘major overall
problem’.216 ‘Just as the old capital rules begat
the current shadow sector, the latest round
known as Basel III could throw up obscure
new participants.’220
The Independent Commission on Banking
Reform have taken a similar view about
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‘shadow banking’ and consider that riskier
activities could move outside the banking
sector. ‘The crisis demonstrated that financial
instability can be caused by activities outside
the regulated banking sector. While additional
regulatory requirements are being imposed on
banks, there is the prospect that riskier activities
will shift to the shadow banking sector, which
to date has received relatively little regulatory
attention’.221 Whereas in the past, the regula-
tors in the United Kingdom focused upon
banks, in the future more attention will be
placed upon the shadow banking sector.222
This will require considerable will, attention
and resources as it may be difficult to regulate
this sector. The FSB has produced a report,223
which is of the view that the shadow bank-
ing sector can create a number of potential
problems: it can create systemic risks; it can
create bank runs similar to those in the banking
system; by creating additional leverage, it can
increase pro-cyclicality; it can cause systemic
problems for the banking sector because of the
close connection of shadow banking with the
mainstream banking sector; and it can reduce
the effectiveness of bank regulation.224 The
FSB was also of the view that lack of
information about the shadow banking sector
and the fact that parts of the shadow banking
sector were located offshore were matters that
needed to be combated if regulation was to be
effective.225 Another view is that being able to
control the shadow banking sector is always
likely to prove difficult. One commentator is of
the opinion that, ‘yIf the reality, however, is
that the mice are smarter and more agile than
the cats – and in some respects more powerful –
all that can be hoped for is some form of
compromisey’.218 This difficulty was recog-
nised in a general way by the Independent
Commission on Banking where it was stated
that the numbers seeking to evade any restric-
tions is greater than the numbers of regulators
seeking to enforce any regulations. Further,
those seeking to evade any regulations had the
necessary incentive to do so and possessed the
necessary ingenuity.226 A further reason why
non-regulated banks might be used is that
it is cheaper to use institutions from the
shadow banking sector.227 Further, because
such institutions will not be subject to
regulatory controls, they are able to take greater
risks and do so more easily.228
Although Basel III closes a number of
identified shortcomings, both the incen-
tives for, and the risks associated with,
regulatory arbitrage will likely increase as
Basel III raises the rigour of bank
regulation.229
THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON
BANKING REFORM
Interim Report
The interim report of the Independent Com-
mission on Banking Reform has proposed a
10 per cent of ‘core tier one’ (best quality capital)
against ‘risk- weighted assets’ as opposed to
the 7 per cent proposed by the Basel Com-
mittee.230 That it is against risk-weighted assets
was confirmed by Sir John Vickers.231
‘The Commission’s view is that the
10 per cent equity baseline should become
the international standard for systemically
important banks, and that it should apply
to large UK retail banking operations in
any event.’232 Further, ‘We believe this
should be agreed internationally. But
whether or not it is, we believe that it
should apply to UK retail banking’.233
The European Union is in the process of
introducing Capital Requirements Directive 4,
which will provide rules for the capital of
banks. It is understood that the Vickers
proposal for retail banks to hold 10 per cent
capital will be allowed under this directive.234
This demonstrates a desire to strengthen the
position even though the Basel Committee’s
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proposals where only proposed shortly before
the interim Vickers report. David Miles of the
Monetary Policy of the Bank of England has
suggested in discussion paper 31235 a much
higher ratio of 15-20 per cent of tier one
capital to risk-weighted assets, and confirms an
inconsistency of approach to that of Basel and
Europe who wish for a much lower ratio. This
discussion paper 31, which wanted a much
higher ratio, concluded236: ‘We conclude that
even proportionally large increases in bank
capital are likely to result in a small long-run
impact on the borrowing costs faced by bank
customers. Even if the amount of bank capital
doubles our estimates suggest that the average
cost of bank funding will increase by only
around 10-40bps. (A doubling in capital would
still mean that banks were financing more than
90 per cent of their assets with debt). But
substantially higher capital requirements could
create very large benefits by reducing the
probability of systemic banking crises’.237
Towards the end of the report, the discussion
paper stated the need for banks to use their
equity rather than their debt: ‘Were banks, over
time, to come to use substantially more equity
and correspondingly less debt, they would not
have to dramatically alter their stock of assets or
cut their lending. The change that is needed is
on the funding side of banks’ balance sheets –
on their liabilities – and not their assets’.238
Such an approach in banks having greater
equity and not reducing their assets is sup-
ported by Robert Jenkins.239
Sir John Vickers, chairperson of the ICB,
Martin Taylor, ICB member, and Bill Winters,
ICB member, recently gave evidence before
the Treasury Committee240 to deal with the
interim proposals made by the Independent
Commission on Banking. Sir John Vickers
indicated that there were inherent risks in retail
banking and this was a good reason for having
greater capital cushions for such banks.241 In
relation to the risk side, Sir John Vickers
confirmed that retail banks would not need to
hold back as much capital on a risk-weighted
basis as investment banks.242 Further, reforms
on capital and liquidity would be part of a
package of reforms including a complete
culture change in the attitude of banks to risk
taking on the part of banks themselves243:
‘ywhat we are recommending is a package
of tools that involves a structural, capital,
liquidity, incentive, governance and culture
dimension. It is the package that is critically
important’.244
Final Report
In relation to the equity to risk weights ratio,
the recommendation of the Independent
Commission is that large ring-fenced banks
should hold an equity ring-fenced buffer of at
least 3 per cent above the Basel III 7 per cent of
risk-weighted assets.245 This confirms and
continues the recommendation made in the
interim report.246 ‘In sum, the Commission
believes that the Basel baseline is by some
margin too low’.247 In order to minimise the
possible anticompetitive effects of this addi-
tional 3 per cent,248 the Independent Commis-
sion recommends the use of a sliding scale from
0 to 3 per cent, 3 per cent being used for the
largest rink-fenced banks.249 Some evidence
that was given to the Independent Commis-
sion was to the effect that ring-fenced banks
should be subject to an even higher ratio than
10 per cent.250 This again shows an inability to
agree to one figure and that there are a range
of views as to what it should be. However,
the Independent Commission strongly rejected
the European Commission’s approach for
harmonisation.
In the context of capital standards for
banks, maximum harmonisation lacks
economic logicy. There are perfectly
good reasons why some EU member
states wish to go beyond International
minimum capital standards. Their bank-
ing systems, including exposures to global
financial markets, are by no means the
samey. For all these reasons, maximum
harmonisation is not the right approach
to capital standards for banksy.251
An overview on the inconsistencies of approach in regulating the capital position of banks: Will the UK step out of line with Europe?
17& 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1745-6452 Journal of Banking Regulation 1–27
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
Some commentators are of the view that in any
event that the differences between the United
Kingdom on the one hand and those of Basel
III and Europe on the other hand are relati-
vely small. Lord Myners considers that the
Vickers proposals are ‘actually not significantly
higher than those in Basel III’.252 Further, the
differences between Europe and the United
Kingdom for the core one tier capital ratio will
be small particularly if Europe decides to raise
this to 9 per cent.253 At a world level, Basel is
aware of problems of inconsistency by sending
out teams around the world to seek to ensure a
uniform approach.254 Nevertheless, problems
remain with differing approaches of the
European Commission to that of the Indepen-
dent Commission on Banking in the United
Kingdom. These differences have been high-
lighted with France and Germany seeking
special treatment for banks that own insurance
companies so that Basel III rules will not fully
apply to such institutions.255
One flashpoint is Mr Barnier’s bank
capital reforms, which respond to the
Basel III international standards. To
the delight of European banks – and the
consternation of Whitehall – the Com-
mission in July proposed a limit on how
much capital national regulators could
force banks to hold. British ministers
think this was deliberately aimed at
undermining the flagship recommenda-
tion of the Vickers commission, which
advocated ring fencing UK retail opera-
tions behind a higher capital buffer.256
CONCLUSION
The proposals of the independent banking
commission would set higher standards for capital
than in many other places for the regulation of
banks. This inconsistency is problematic and
could cause uncertainty among UK banks.
If the Governor of the Bank of England has his
way and is given increased powers to regulate,
then suggestions of higher capital standards
could become a reality. UK banks would then
be subject to two regulators with European and
Basel regulatory regimes being of a lesser
standard. Not only would there be an unlevel
playing field, but it might become unclear as to
the standards that groups of banks and their
subsidiaries should seek to comply with.
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